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Abstract
We conduct the first natural field experiment to explore the relationship between
the “meaningfulness” of a task and worker effort. We employed about 2,500
workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online labor market, to
label medical images. Although given an identical task, we experimentally ma-
nipulated how the task was framed. Subjects in the meaningful treatment were
told that they were labeling tumor cells in order to assist medical researchers,
subjects in the zero-context condition (the control group) were not told the pur-
pose of the task, and, in stark contrast, subjects in the shredded treatment were
not given context and were additionally told that their work would be discarded.
We found that when a task was framed more meaningfully, workers were more
likely to participate. We also found that the meaningful treatment increased
the quantity of output (with an insignificant change in quality) while the shred-
ded treatment decreased the quality of output (with no change in quantity).
We believe these results will generalize to other short-term labor markets. Our
study also discusses MTurk as an exciting platform for running natural field
experiments in economics.
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1. Introduction
Economists, philosophers, and social scientists have long recognized that
non-pecuniary factors are powerful motivators that influence choice of occupa-
tion. For a multidisciplinary literature review on the role of meaning in the
workplace, we recommend Rosso et al. (2010). Previous studies in this area
have generally been based on ethnographies, observational studies, or labora-
tory experiments. For instance, Wrzesniewski et al. (1997) used ethnographies
to classify work into jobs, careers, or callings. Using an observation study, Pre-
ston (1989) demonstrated that workers may accept lower wages in the non-profit
sector in order to produce goods with social externalities. Finally, Ariely et al.
(2008) showed that labor had to be both recognizable and purposeful to have
meaning. In this paper, we limit our discussion to the role of meaning in eco-
nomics, particularly through the lens of competing differentials. We perform
the first natural field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) in a real effort task
that manipulates levels of meaningfulness. This method overcomes a number
of shortcomings of the previous literature, including: interview bias, omitted
variable bias, and concerns of external validity beyond the laboratory.
We study whether employers can deliberately alter the perceived “meaning-
fulness” of a task in order to induce people to do more and higher quality work
and thereby work for a lower wage. We chose a task that would appear mean-
ingful for many people if given the right context — helping cancer researchers
mark tumor cells in medical images. Subjects in the meaningful treatment were
told the purpose of their task is to “help researchers identify tumor cells;” sub-
jects in our zero-context group were not given any reason for their work and
the cells were instead referred to as mere “objects of interest” and laborers in
the shredded group were given zero context but also explicitly told that their
labelings would be discarded upon submission. Hence, the pay structure, task
requirements, and working conditions were identical, but we added cues to alter
the perceived meaningfulness of the task.
We recruited workers from the United States and India from Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk (MTurk), an online labor market where people around the world
complete short, “one-off” tasks for pay. The MTurk environment is a spot
market for labor characterized by relative anonymity and a lack of strong rep-
utational mechanisms. As a result, it is well-suited for an experiment involving
the meaningfulness of a task since the variation we introduce regarding a task’s
meaningfulness is less affected by desires to exhibit pro-social behavior or an
anticipation of future work (career concerns). We ensured that our task ap-
peared like any other task in the marketplace and was comparable in terms of
difficulty, duration, and wage.
Our study is representative of the kinds of natural field experiments for
which MTurk is particularly suited. Section 2.2 explores MTurk’s potential as a
platform for field experimentation using the framework proposed in Levitt and
List (2007, 2009).
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We contribute to the literature on compensating wage differentials (Rosen,
1986) and the organizational behavioral literature on the role of meaning in the
workplace (Rosso et al., 2010). Within economics, Stern (2004) provides quasi-
experimental evidence on compensating differentials within the labor market
for scientists by comparing wages for academic and private sector job offers
among recent Ph.D. graduates. He finds that “scientists pay to be scientists”
and require higher wages in order to accept private sector research jobs because
of the reduced intellectual freedom and a reduced ability to interact with the
scientific community and receive social recognition. Ariely et al. (2008) use a
laboratory experiment with undergraduates to vary the meaningfulness of two
separate tasks: (1) assembling Legos and (2) finding 10 instances of consecutive
letters from a sheet of random letters. Our experiment augments experiment
1 in Ariely et al. (2008) by testing whether their results extend to the field.
Additionally, we introduce a richer measure of task effort, namely task quality.
Where our experiments are comparable, we find that our results parallel theirs.
We find that the main effects of making our task more meaningful is to
induce a higher fraction of workers to complete our task, hereafter dubbed as
“induced to work.” In the meaningful treatment, 80.6% of people labeled at
least one image compared with 76.2% in the zero-context and 72.3% in the
shredded treatments.
After labeling their first image, workers were given the opportunity to la-
bel additional images at a declining piecerate. We also measure whether the
treatments increase the quantity of images labeled. We classify participants as
“high-output” workers if they label five or more images (an amount correspond-
ing to roughly the top tercile of those who label) and we find that workers are
approximately 23% more likely to be high-output workers in the meaningful
group.
We introduce a measure of task quality by telling workers the importance of
accurately labeling each cell by clicking as close to the center as possible. We
first note that MTurk labor is high quality, with an average of 91% of cells found.
The meaning treatment had an ambiguous effect, but the shredded condition in
both countries lowered the proportion of cells found by about 7%.
By measuring both quantity and quality we are able to observe how task
effort is apportioned between these two “dimensions of effort.” Do workers work
“harder” or “longer” or both? We found an interesting result: the meaningful
condition seems to increase quantity without a corresponding increase in quality
and the shredded treatment decreases quality without a corresponding decrease
in quantity. Investigating whether this pattern generalizes to other domains
may be a fruitful future research avenue.
Finally, we calculate participants’ average hourly waged based on how long
they spent on the task. We find that subjects in the meaningful group work
for $1.34 per hour, which is 6 cents less per hour than zero context participants
and 14 cents less per hour than shredded condition participants.
We expect our findings to generalize to other short-term work environments
such as temporary employment or piecework. In these environments, employers
may not consider that non-pecuniary incentives of meaningfulness matter; we
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argue that these incentives do matter, and to a significant degree.
Section 2 provides background on MTurk and discusses its use as a platform
for conducting economic field experiments. Section 3 describes our experimental
design. Section 4 presents our results and discussion and Section 5 concludes.
Appendix A provides full details on our experimental design and Appendix B
is a technical appendix for conducting experiments using the MTurk platform.
2. Mechanical Turk and its potential for field experimentation
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is the largest online, task-based labor
market and is used by hundreds of thousands of people worldwide. Individuals
and companies can post tasks (known as Human Intelligence Tasks, or “HITs”)
and have them completed by an on-demand labor force. Typical tasks include
image labeling, audio transcription, and basic internet research. Academics
also use MTurk to outsource low-skilled resource tasks such as identifying lin-
guistic patterns in text (Sprouse, 2011) and labeling medical images (Holmes
and Kapelner, 2010). The image labeling system from the latter study, known
as “DistributeEyes,” was originally used by breast cancer researchers and was
modified for our experiment.
Beyond simply using MTurk as a source of labor, academics have also began
using MTurk as a way to conduct online experiments. The remainder of the
section highlights some of the ways this subject pool is used and places special
emphasis on the suitability of the environment for natural field experiments in
economics.
2.1. General use by social scientists
As Henrich et al. (2010) argue, many findings from social science are dis-
proportionately based on what he calls “W.E.I.R.D.” subject pools (Western,
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) and as a result it is inappro-
priate to believe the results generalize to larger populations. Since MTurk has
users from around the world, it is also possible to conduct research across cul-
tures. For example, Eriksson and Simpson (2010) use a cross-national sample
from MTurk to test whether differential preferences for competitive environ-
ments are explained by females’ stronger emotional reaction to losing, hypoth-
esized by Croson and Gneezy (2009).
It is natural to ask whether results from MTurk generalize to other popula-
tions. Paolacci et al. (2010) assuage these concerns by replicating three classic
framing experiments on MTurk: The Asian Disease Problem, the Linda Problem
and the Physician Problem; Horton et al. (2011) provide additional replication
evidence for experiments related to framing, social preferences, and priming.
Berinsky et al. (2012) argues that the MTurk population has “attractive char-
acteristics” because it approximates gold-standard probability samples of the
US population. All three studies find that the direction and magnitude of the
effects line up well compared with those found in the laboratory.
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An advantage of MTurk relative to the laboratory is that the researcher can
rapidly scale experiments and recruit hundreds of subjects within only a few
days and at substantially lower costs.1
2.2. Suitability for natural field experiments in Economics
Apart from general usage by academics, the MTurk environment offers addi-
tional benefits for experimental economists and researchers conducting natural
field experiments. We analyze the MTurk environment within the framework
laid out in Levitt and List (2007, 2009).
In the ideal natural field experiment, “the environment is such that the
subjects naturally undertake these tasks and [do not know] that they are par-
ticipants in an experiment.” Additionally, the experimenter must exert a high
degree of control over the environment without attracting attention or causing
participants to behave unnaturally. MTurk’s power comes from the ability to
construct customized and highly-tailored environments related to the question
being studied. It is possible to collect very detailed measures of user behav-
ior such as precise time spent on a webpage, mouse movements, and positions
of clicks. In our experiment, we use such data to construct a precise quality
measure.
MTurk is particularly well-suited to using experimenter-as-employer designs
(Gneezy and List, 2006) as a way to study worker incentives and the employ-
ment relationship without having to rely on cooperation of private sector firms.2
For example, Barankay (2010) posted identical image labeling tasks and varied
whether workers were given feedback on their relative performance (i.e., rank-
ing) in order to study whether providing rank-order feedback led workers to
return for a subsequent work opportunity. For a more detailed overview of how
online labor markets can be used in experiments, see Horton et al. (2011).
Levitt and List (2007) enumerate possible complications that arise when
experimental findings are extrapolated outside the lab: scrutiny, anonymity,
stakes, selection, and artificial restrictions. We analyze each complication in the
context of our experiment and in the context of experimentation using MTurk
in general.
Scrutiny and anonymity. In the lab, experimenter effects can be powerful;
subjects behave differently if they are aware their behavior is being watched.
Relatedly, subjects frequently lack anonymity and believe their choices will be
scrutinized after the experiment. In MTurk, interaction between workers and
employers is almost non-existent; most tasks are completed without any commu-
nication and workers are only identifiable by a numeric identifier. Consequently,
we believe that MTurk experiments are less likely to be biased by these compli-
cations.
1For example, in our study we paid 2,471 subjects $789 total and they worked 701 hours
(equating to 31 cents per observation). This includes 60 subjects whose data were not usable.
2Barankay (2010) remarks that “the experimenter [posing] as the firm [gives] substantial
control about the protocol and thereby eliminates many project risks related to field experi-
ments.
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Stakes. In the lab or field, it’s essential to “account properly for the differ-
ences in stakes across settings” (Levitt and List, 2007). We believe that our
results would generalize to other short-term work environments, but would not
expect them to be generalizable to long-term employment decisions such as oc-
cupational choice. Stakes must also be chosen adequately for the environment
and so we were careful to match wages to the market average.
Selection. Experiments fail to be generalizable when “participants in the
study differ in systematic ways from the actors engaged in the targeted real-
world setting.” We know that within MTurk, it is unlikely that there is se-
lection into our experiment since our task was designed similar in appearance
to real tasks. The MTurk population also seems representative along a num-
ber of observable demographic characteristics (Berinsky et al., 2012); however,
we acknowledge that there are potentially unobservable differences between our
subject pool and the broader population. Still, we believe that MTurk sub-
ject behavior would generalize to workers’ behavior in other short-term labor
markets.
Artificial restrictions. Lab experiments place unusual and artificial restric-
tions on the actions available to subjects and they examine only small, non-
representative windows of time because the experimenter typically doesn’t have
subjects and time horizons for an experiment. In structuring our experiment,
workers had substantial latitude in how they performed their task. In con-
trast with the lab, subjects could “show-up” to our task whenever they wanted,
leave at will, and were not time-constrained. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that
while our experiment succeeded in matching short-term labor environments like
MTurk, that our results do not easily generalize to longer-term employment
relationships.
Levitt and List (2009) highlight two limitations of field experiments vis-a-
vis laboratory experiments: the need for cooperation with third parties and the
difficulty of replication. MTurk does not suffer from these limitations. Work
environments can be created by researchers without the need of a private sector
partner, whose interests may diverge substantially from that of the researcher.
Further, MTurk experiments can be replicated simply by downloading source
code and re-running the experiment. In many ways, this allows a push-button
replication that is far better than that offered in the lab.
3. Experimental Design
3.1. Subject recruitment
In running our randomized natural field experiment, we posted our exper-
imental task so that it would appear like any other task (image labeling tasks
are among the most commonly performed tasks on MTurk). Subjects had no
indication they were participating in an experiment. Moreover, since MTurk is
a market where people ordinarily perform one-off tasks, our experiment could
be listed inconspicuously.
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We hired a total of 2,471 workers (1,318 from the US and 1,153 from India).
Although we tried to recruit equally from both countries, there were fewer Indi-
ans in our sample since attrition in India was higher. We collected each worker’s
age and gender during a “colorblindness” test that we administered as part of
the task. These and other summary statistics can be found in Table 1. By
contracting workers from the US and India, we can also test whether workers
from each country respond differentially to the meaningfulness of a task.
Our task was presented so that it appeared like a one-time work opportunity
(subjects were barred from doing the experiment more than once) and our design
sought to maximize the amount of work we could extract during this short
interaction. The first image labeling paid $0.10, the next paid $0.09, etc, leveling
off at $0.02 per image. This wage structure was also used in Ariely et al. (2008)
and has the benefit of preventing people from working too long.
3.2. Description of experimental conditions
Upon accepting our task, workers provided basic demographic information
and passed a color-blindness test. Next, they were randomized into either the
meaningful, the zero-context, or the shredded condition. Those in the shredded
condition were shown a warning message stating that their labeling will not be
recorded and we gave them the option to leave. Then, all participants were
forced to watch an instructional video which they could not fast-forward. See
Appendix A for the full script of the video as well as screenshots.
The video for the meaningful treatment began immediately with cues of
meaning. We adopt a similar working definition of “meaningfulness” as used in
Ariely et al. (2008): “Labor [or a task] is meaningful to the extent that (a) it is
recognized and/or (b) has some point or purpose.”
We varied the levels of meaningfulness by altering the degree of recognition
and the detail used to explain the purpose of our task. In our meaningful group,
we provided “recognition” by thanking the laborers for working on our task. We
then explained the “purpose” of the task by creating a narrative explaining how
researchers were inundated with more medical images than they could possibly
label and that they needed the help of ordinary people. In contrast, the zero-
context and shredded groups were not given recognition, told the purpose of
the task, or thanked for participating; they were only given basic instructions.
Analyzing the results from a post-manipulation check (see section 4.4), we are
confident that these cues of meaning induced the desired affect.
Both videos identically described the wage structure and the mechanics of
how to label cells and properly use the task interface (including zooming in/out
and deleting points, which are metrics we analyze). However, in the meaningful
treatment, cells were referred to as “cancerous tumor cells” whereas in the zero-
context and shredded treatments, they were referred to as nondescript “objects
of interest.” Except for this phrase change, both scripts were identical during
the instructional sections of the videos. To emphasize these cues, workers in the
meaningful group heard the words “tumor,” “tumor cells,” “cells,” etc. 16 times
before labeling their first image and similar cues on the task interface reminded
them of the purpose of the task as they labeled.
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3.3. Task interface, incentive structure, and response variables
After the video, we administered a short multiple-choice quiz testing workers’
comprehension of the task and user interface. In the shredded condition, we gave
a final question asking workers to again acknowledge that their work will not
be recorded.
Upon passing the quiz, workers were directed to a task interface which dis-
played the image to be labeled and allowed users to mark cancerous tumor cells
(or “objects of interest”) by clicking (see figure 1). The image shown was one
of ten look-alike photoshopped images displayed randomly. We also provide the
workers with controls — zoom functionality and the ability to delete points —
whose proper use would allow them to produce high-quality labelings.
Figure 1: Main task portal for a subject in the meaningful treatment Workers were
asked to identify all tumors in the image. Each image had 90 cells and took 5 minutes on
average. Our interface reminds the workers in 8 places that they are identifying tumor cells.
The black circles around each point were not visible to participants. We display them to
illustrate the size of a 10-pixel radius.
During the experiment, we measured three response variables: (1) induced
to work, (2) quantity of image labelings, and (3) quality of image labelings.
Many subjects can – and – do stop performing a task even after agreeing to
complete it. While submitting bad work on MTurk is penalized, workers can
abandon a task with only nominal penalty. Hence, we measure attrition with
the response variable induced to work. Workers were only counted as induced
to work if they watched the video, passed the quiz, and completed one image
labeling. Our experimental design deliberately encourages attrition by imposing
an upfront and unpaid cost of watching a three-minute instructional video and
passing a quiz before moving on to the actual task.
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Workers were paid $0.10 for the first image labeling. They were then given an
option to label another image for $0.09, and then another image for $0.08, and
so on.3 At $0.02, we stopped decreasing the wage and the worker was allowed
to label images at this pay rate indefinitely. After each image, the worker could
either collect what they had earned thus far, or label more images. We used the
quantity of image labelings for our second response variable.
In our instructional video, we emphasized the importance of marking the
exact center of each cell. When a worker labeled a cell by clicking on the image,
we measured that click location to the nearest pixel. Thus, we were able to
detect if the click came “close” to the actual cell. Our third response variable,
quality of image labelings is the proportion of objects identified based on whether
a worker’s click fell within a pixel radius from the object’s true center. We will
discuss the radii we picked in the following section.
After workers chose to stop labeling images and collect their earnings, they
were given a five-question PMC survey which asked whether they thought the
task (a) was enjoyable (b) had purpose (c) gave them a sense of accomplishment
(d) was meaningful (e) made their efforts recognized. Responses were collected
on a five-point Likert scale. We also provided a text box to elicit free-response
comments.4
3.4. Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. We hypothesize that at equal wages, the meaningful treatment
will have the highest proportion of workers induced to work and the shredded
condition will have the lowest proportion. In the following section, we provide
theoretical justification for this prediction.
Hypothesis 2. As in Ariely et al. (2008), we hypothesize that quantity of images
labeled will be increasing in the level of meaningfulness.
Hypothesis 3. In addition to quantity, we measure the quality of image labelings
and hypothesize that this is increasing in the level of meaningfulness.
Hypothesis 4. Based upon prior survey research on MTurk populations, we hy-
pothesize that Indian workers are less responsive to meaning. Ipeirotis (2010)
finds that Indians are more likely to have MTurk as a primary source of income
(27% vs. 14% in the US). Likewise, people in the US are nearly twice as likely
to report doing tasks because they are fun (41% vs. 20%). Therefore, one might
expect financial motivations to be more important for Indian workers.5
3Each image was randomly picked from a pool of ten look-alike images.
4About 24% of respondents left comments (no difference across treatments).
5Although Horton et al. (2011) find that workers of both types are strongly motivated by
money.
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4. Experimental Results and Discussion
We ran the experiment on N = 2, 471 subjects (1,318 from the United States
and 1,153 from India). Table 1 shows summary statistics for our response vari-
ables (induced to work, number of images, and quality), demographic variables,
and hourly wage.
Shredded Zero Meaningful US India
Context only only
% Induced to Work .723 .762 .806 .85 .666
# Images (if ≥ 1) 5.94 ± 6.8 6.11 ± 6.9 7.12 ± 7.6 5.86 ± 6.1 7.17 ± 8.3
Did ≥ 2 labelings .696 .706 .75 .797 .627
Did ≥ 5 labelings .343 .371 .456 .406 .373
Avg Hourly Wage $1.49 $1.41 $1.34 $1.50 $1.29
% Male .616 .615 .58 .483 .743
Age 29.6 ± 9.3 29.6 ± 9.5 29.3 ± 9.1 31.8 ± 10.5 26.9 ± 6.8
N 828 798 845 1318 1153
Coarse quality .883 ± .21 .904 ± .18 .930 ± .14 .924 ± .15 .881 ± .21
Fine quality .614 ± .22 .651 ± .21 .676 ± .18 .668 ± .19 .621 ± .26
PMC Meaning 3.44 ± 1.3 3.54 ± 1.2 4.37 ± 0.9 3.67 ± 1.3 3.98 ± 1.1
Table 1: Summary statistics for response variables and demographics by treatment and coun-
try. The statistics for the quality metrics are computed by averaging each worker’s average
quality (only for workers who labeled one or more images). The statistics for the PMC mean-
ing question only include workers who finished the task and survey.
Broadly speaking, as the level of meaning increases, subjects are more likely
to participate and they label more images and with higher quality. Across all
treatments, US workers participate more often, label more images, and mark
points with greater accuracy. Table 2 uses a heatmap to illustrate our main effect
sizes and their significance levels by treatment, country, and response variable.
Each cell indicates the size of a treatment effect relative to the control (i.e., zero
context condition). Statistically significant positive effects are indicated using
green fill where darker green indicates higher levels of significance. Statistically
significant negative effects are indicated using red fill where darker red indicates
higher levels of significance. Black text without fill indicates effects that are
marginally significant (p < 0.10). Light gray text indicates significance levels
above 0.10.
Overall, we observe that the meaningful condition induces an increase in
quantity without significantly increasing quality, and the shredded condition in-
duces a quality decrease with quantity remaining constant. This “checkerboard
effect” may indicate that meaning plays a role in moderating how workers trade
quantity for quality i.e. how their energy is channeled in the task.
We now investigate each response variable individually.
4.1. Labor Participation Results: “Induced to work”
We investigate how treatment and country affects whether or not subjects
chose to do our task. Unlike in a laboratory environment, our subjects were
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Induced Did ≥ 5 Fine Average Hourly
to work labelings Quality Wage
Meaningful ↑ 4.6%* ↑ 8.5%*** ↑ 0.7% ↓ 4.5%
Meaningful (US) ↑ 5.1%* ↑ 8.9%** ↑ 3.9% ↓ 7.7%
Meaningful (India) ↓ 2.3% ↑ 7.0%* ↓ 3.1% ↑ 0.5%
Shredded ↓ 4.0% ↓ 2.8% ↓ 7.2%*** ↑ 5.6%
Shredded (US) ↓ 2.3% ↓ 5.0% ↓ 6.1%* ↑ 9.5%
Shredded (India) ↓ 6.8% ↓ 1.6% ↓ 8.7%** ↓ 1.4%
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Table 2: A heatmap illustration of our results. Rows 1 and 4 consider data from both America
and India combined. Columns 1, 2, 3 show the results of regressions and column 4 shows
the result of two-sample t-tests. Results reported are from regressions without demographic
controls.
workers in a relatively anonymous labor market and were not paid a “show-up
fee.” On MTurk, workers frequently start but do not finish tasks; attrition is
therefore a practical concern for employers who hire from this market. In our
experiment, on average, 25% of subjects began, but did not follow-through by
completing one full labeling.
Even in this difficult environment, we were able to increase participation
among workers by roughly 4.6% by framing the task as more meaningful (see
columns 1 and 2 of table 3). The effect is robust to including various controls for
age, gender, and time of day effects. As a subject in the meaningful treatment
told us, “It’s always nice to have [HITs] that take some thought and mean
something to complete. Thank you for bringing them to MTurk.” The shredded
treatment discouraged workers and caused them to work 4.0% less often but
the effect was less significant (p = 0.057 without controls and p = 0.082 with
controls). Thus, hypothesis 1 seems to be correct.
Irrespective of treatment, subjects from India completed an image 18.5% less
often (p < 0.001) than subjects from the US. We were interested in interactions
between country and treatment, so we ran the separate induced-to-work regres-
sion results by country (unshown). We did not find significant effects within the
individual countries because we were underpowered to detect this effect when
the sample size was halved. We find no difference in the treatment effect for
induced to work between India and the United States (p = 0.97). This is incon-
sistent with hypothesis 4 where we predicted Indian subjects to respond more
strongly to pecuniary incentives.
It is also possible that the effects for induced to work were weak because
subjects could have still attributed meaning to the zero context and shredded
conditions, a problem that will affect our results for quantiy and quality as well.
This serves to bias our treatment effects downward suggesting that the true effect
of meaning would be larger. For instance, one zero-context subject told us, “I
assumed the ‘objects’ were cells so I guess that was kind of interesting.” Another
subject in the zero-context treatment advised us, “you could put MTurkers to
11
Induced Induced Did ≥ 2 Did ≥ 2 Did ≥ 5 Did ≥ 5
Meaningful 0.046* 0.046* 0.047* 0.050* 0.085*** 0.088***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Shredded -0.040 -0.037 -0.012 -0.005 -0.028 -0.023
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
India -0.185*** -0.183*** -0.170*** -0.156*** -0.035 -0.003
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Male 0.006 -0.029 -0.081***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
Constant 0.848*** 0.907*** 0.785*** 0.873*** 0.387*** 0.460***
Controls
Age 0.23 0.29 0.92
Time of Day 0.16 0.06 0.46
Day of Week 0.08 0.00** 0.55
R2 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02
N 2471 2471 2471 2471 2471 2471
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Table 3: Robust linear regression results for the main treatment effects on quantity of images.
Columns 1, 3 and 5 only include treatments and country. Columns 2, 4, and 6 control for
gender, age categories, time of day, and day of week. Rows 6-8 show p-values for the partial
F -test for sets of different types of control variables.
good use doing similar work with images, e.g. in dosimetry or pathology ... and
it would free up medical professionals to do the heftier work.”
4.2. Quantity Results: Number of images labeled
Table 1 shows that the number of images increased with meaning. However,
this result is conditional on being induced to work and is therefore contaminated
with selection bias. We follow Angrist (2001) and handle selection by creating
a dummy variable for “did two or more labelings” and a dummy for “did five
or more labelings” and use them as responses (other cutoffs produced similar
results).
We find mixed results regarding whether the the level of meaningfulness
affects the quantity of output. Being assigned to the meaningful treatment
group did have a positive effect, but assignment to the shredded treatment did
not result in a corresponding decrease in output.
Analyzing the outcome “two or more labelings,” column 3 of table 3 shows
that the meaningful treatment induced 4.7% more subjects to label two or more
images (p < 0.05). The shredded treatment had no effect. Analyzing the
outcome “five or more labelings” (column 5), which we denote as “high-output
workers,”6 the meaningful treatment was highly significant and induced 8.5%
6Labeling five or more images corresponds to the top tercile of quantity among people who
were induced to work.
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more workers (p < 0.001 with and without controls), an increase of nearly 23
percent, and the shredded treatment again has no effect.
Hypothesis 2 (quantity increases with meaningfulness) seems to be correct
only when comparing the meaningful treatment to the zero-context treatment.
An ambiguous effect of the shredded treatment on quantity is also reported by
Ariely et al. (2008).
We didn’t find differential effects between the United States and India. In
an unshown regression, we found that Americans were 9.5% more likely to label
five or more images (p < 0.01) and Indians were 8.4% more likely to label five
or more (p < 0.05). These two effects were not found to be different (p = 0.84)
which is inconsistent with hypothesis 4 that Indians are more motivated by
pecuniary incentives than Americans.
Interestingly, we also observed a number of “target-earners” who stopped
upon reaching exactly one dollar in earnings. A mass of 16 participants stopped
at one dollar, while one participant stopped at $1.02 and not one stopped at
$0.98, an effect also observed by Horton and Chilton (2010). The worker who
labored longest spent 2 hours and 35 minutes and labeled 77 images.
4.3. Quality Results: Accuracy of labeling
Quality was measured by the fraction of cells labeled at a distance of five
pixels (“coarse quality”) and two pixels (“fine quality”) from their true centers.
In presenting our results (see table 4), we analyze the treatment effects using
our fine quality measure. The coarse quality regression results were similar, but
the fine quality had a much more dispersed distribution.7
Our main result is that fine quality was 7.2% lower in the shredded treat-
ment, but there wasn’t a large corresponding increase in the meaningful treat-
ment.8 This makes sense; if the workers knew their labelings weren’t going
to be checked, there is no incentive to mark points carefully. This result was
not different across countries (regression unshown). The meaningful treatment
has a marginally significant effect only in the United States, where fine quality
increased by 3.9% (p = 0.092 without controls and p = 0.044 with controls),
but there was no effect in India. Thus, hypothesis 3 (quality increases with
meaningfulness) seems to be correct only when comparing the shredded to the
zero context treatment which is surprising.
Although Indian workers were less accurate than United States workers and
had 5.3% lower quality (p < 0.001 and robust to controls), United States and
Indian workers did not respond differentially to the shredded treatment (p =
0.53). This again is inconsistent with hypothesis 4.
7The inter-quartile range of coarse quality overall was [93.3%, 97.2%] whereas the IQR of
fine quality was overall [54.7%, 80.0%].
8One caveat with our quality results is that we only observe quality for people who were
induced to work and selected into our experiment (we have “attrition bias”). Attrition was 4%
higher in the shredded treatment and we presume that the people who opted out of labeling
images would have labeled them with far worse quality had they remained in the experiment.
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Fine Quality
Both Countries United States India
Meaningful 0.007 0.014 0.039 0.039* -0.031 -0.013
(0.017) (0.014) (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.021)
Shredded -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.061* -0.066** -0.087** -0.073**
(0.021) (0.017) (0.027) (0.023) (0.031) (0.023)
India -0.053*** -0.057***
(0.015) (0.013)
Male 0.053*** 0.014 0.100***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.021)
Labelings 6—10 -0.018** -0.024** -0.016*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Labelings ≥ 11 -0.140*** -0.116*** -0.148***
(0.017) (0.029) (0.020)
Constant 0.666*** 0.645*** 0.651*** 0.625*** 0.634*** 0.588***
Controls
Image 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Age 0.10 0.01** 0.25
Time of Day 0.33 0.29 0.78
Day of Week 0.12 0.46 0.26
R2 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.20
N 12724 12724 6777 6777 5947 5947
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Table 4: Robust linear regression clustered by subject for country and treatment on fine quality
as measured by the number of cells found two pixels from their exact centers. Columns 1, 3
and 5 include only treatments and country. Columns 2, 4, and 6 control for number of images,
the particular image (of the ten images), gender, age categories, time of day, and day of week.
Experience matters. Once subjects had between 6 and 10 labelings under
their belt, they were 1.8% less accurate (p < 0.01), and if they had done more
than 10 labelings, they were 14% less accurate (p < 0.001). This result may
reflect negative selection — subjects who labeled a very high number of images
were probably working too fast or not carefully enough.9 Finally, we found that
some of the ten images were substantial harder to label accurately than others
(a partial F-test for equality of fixed effects results in p < 0.001).
4.4. Post Manipulation Check Results
In order to understand how our treatments affected the perceived mean-
ingfulness of the task, we gave a post manipulation check to all subjects who
completed at least one image and did not abandon the task before payment.
This data should be interpreted cautiously given that subjects who completed
the tasks and our survey are not representative of all subjects in our experi-
9Anecdotally, subjects from the shredded condition who submitted comments regarding
the task were less likely to have expressed concerns about their accuracy. One subject from
the meaningful group remarked that “[his] mouse was too sensitive to click accurately, even all
the way zoomed in,” but we found no such apologies or comments from people in the shredded
group.
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ment.10
We found that those in the meaningful treatment rated significantly higher in
the post manipulation check in both the United States and India. Using a five-
point Likert scale, we asked workers to rate the perceived level of meaningful-
ness, purpose, enjoyment, accomplishment, and recognition. In the meaningful
treatment, subjective ratings were higher in all categories but the self-rated level
of meaningfulness and purpose were the highest. The level of meaningfulness
was 1.3 points higher in the US and 0.6 points higher in the India; the level of
perceived porposefulness was 1.2 points higher in America and 0.5 points higher
in India. In the United States, the level of accomplishment only increased by 0.8
and the level of enjoyment and recognition increased by 0.3 and 0.5 respectively
with a marginal increase in India. As a US participant told us, “I felt it was a
privilege to work on something so important and I would like to thank you for
the opportunity.”
We conclude that the meaningful frames accomplished their goal. Remark-
ably, those in the shredded treatment in either country did not report signifi-
cantly lower ratings on any of the items in the post manipulation check. Thus,
the shredded treatment may not have had the desired effect.
5. Conclusion
Our experiment is the first that uses a natural field experiment in a real
labor market to examine how a task’s meaningfulness influences labor supply.
Overall, we found that the greater the amount of meaning, the more likely
a subject is to participate, the more output they produce, the higher quality
output they produce, and the less compensation they require for their time. We
also observe an interesting effect: high meaning increases quantity of output
(with an insignificant increase in quality) and low meaning decreases quality of
output (with no change in quantity). It is possible that the level of perceived
meaning affects how workers substitute their efforts between task quantity and
task quality. The effect sizes were found to be the same in the US and India.
Our finding has important implications for those who employ labor in any
short-term capacity besides crowdsourcing, such as temp-work or piecework. As
the world begins to outsource more of its work to anonymous pools of labor,
it is vital to understand the dynamics of this labor market and the degree to
which non-pecuniary incentives matter. This study demonstrates that they do
matter, and they matter to a significant degree.
This study also serves as an example of what MTurk offers economists: an
excellent platform for high internal validity natural field experiments while evad-
ing the external validity problems that may occur in laboratory environments.
10Ideally, we would have collected this information immediately after introducing the treat-
ment condition. However, doing so would have compromised the credibility of our natural
field experiment.
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Appendix A. Detailed Experimental Design
This section details exact screens shown to users in the experimental groups.
The worker begins by encountering the HIT on the MTurk platform (see Figure
A.2).
Figure A.2: The HIT as initially encountered on MTurk. Note: we used an alias in order to
appear as a non-corporate and non-institutional employer.
The worker can then click on the HIT and they see the “preview screen”
which describes the HIT (not shown) with text. In retrospect, a flashy image
enticing the worker into the HIT would most likely have increased throughput. If
the worker chooses to accept, they are immediately directed to a multi-purpose
page which hosts a colorblindness test, demographic survey, and an audio test
for functioning speakers (see Figure A.3). Although many tasks require workers
to answer questions before working, we avoided asking too many survey-like
questions to avoid appearing as an experiment.
At this point, the worker is randomized into one of the three treatments
and transitioned to the “qualification test.” The page displays an instructional
video varying by treatment which they cannot fast-forward. Screenshots of the
video are shown in Figures A.4, A.5, and A.6.11
We include the verbatim script for the videos below. Text that differs be-
tween treatments is typeset in square brackets separated by a slash. The text
before the slash in red belongs to the meaningful treatment and the text follow-
ing the slash in blue belongs to both the zero-context and shredded treatments.
Thanks for participating in this task. [Your job will be to help identify tumor cells
in images and we appreciate your help. / In this task, you’ll look at images and find
objects of interest.]
In this video tutorial, we’ll explain [three / two] things:
[First, why you’re labeling the images, which is to help researchers identify tumorous
cancer cells. Next, we’ll show you how to identify those tumor cells. / First, we’ll
show you how to identify objects of interest in images.] [Finally, / Then,] we’ll explain
how after labeling your first image you’ll have a chance to label some more.
11We thank Rob Cohen who did an excellent job narrating both scripts.
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Figure A.3: The colorblindness test
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(a) Zero-context / Shredded treatments (b) Meaningful treatment
Figure A.4: Opening screen of training video.
Figure A.5: Examples of meaningful cues which are not present in the Zero-context and
Shredded treatment instructional video.
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Now we’re ready to learn how to identify [tumor cells / objects of interest] in images.
Some example pictures of the [tumor cells / objects of interest] you’ll be identifying
can be found at the bottom left. Each [tumor cell / object of interest] is blue and
circular and surrounded by a red border.
(a) Zero-context / Shredded treatments (b) Meaningful treatment
Figure A.6: Describing the training process.
When you begin each image, the magnification will be set to the lowest resolution.
This gives you an overview of all points on the image, but you’ll need to zoom in and
out in order to make the most precise clicks in the center of the [tumor cells / objects
of interest].
Let’s scroll through the image and find some [tumor cells / objects of interest] to
identify.
Here’s a large cluster of [tumor cells / objects of interest]. To identify them, it is
very important to click as closely to the center as possible on each [cell / object] . If
I make a mistake and don’t click in the center, I can undo the point by right-clicking.
Notice that this [cell / point] isn’t entirely surrounded by red, [probably because the
cell broke off]. Even though it’s not entirely surrounded by red, we still want to
identify it as a [tumor cell / object of interest].
In order to ensure that you’ve located all [tumor cells / objects of interest], you should
use the thumbnail view in the top right. You can also use the magnification buttons
to zoom out.
It looks like we missed a cluster of [tumor cells / objects of interest] at the bottom.
Let’s go identify those points.
Remember once again, that if you click on something that is not a [tumor cell / object
of interest], you can unclick by right-clicking.
Using the scroll bars, we’ll navigate to the other points ... and here’s some more to
the left ... Now that we think we’ve identified all points, let’s zoom out to be sure
and scroll around.
Before submitting, we should be sure of three things: (1) That we’ve identified all
[tumor cells / objects of interest] (2) That we’ve clicked in the center of each one (3)
That we haven’t clicked on anything that’s not a [tumor cell / object of interest].
Once we’ve done that, we’re ready to submit.
Finally, after you complete your first image, you’ll have an opportunity to label
additional images as part of this HIT.
The first images you label will pay more to compensate for training.
After that, as part of this HIT you’ll have the chance to identify as many additional
images as you like as long as you aren’t taking more than 15 minutes per image.
Although you can label unlimited images in this HIT, you won’t be able to accept
more HITs. This is to give a variety of turkers an opportunity to identify the images.
[Thank you for your time and effort. Advances in the field of cancer and treatment
prevention rely on the selfless contributions of countless individuals such as yourself.]
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Figure A.7: The quiz after watching the training video for the meaningful treatment. In the
zero-context and shredded treatments, all mention of “tumor cells” are replaced by “objects
of interest.” The shredded treatment has an additional question asking them to acknowledge
that they are working on a test system and their work will be discarded. Green indicates a
correct response; red indicates an incorrect response.
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Then, workers must take a quiz (see Figure A.7). During the quiz, they can
watch the video freely (which was rarely done).
Upon passing, they began labeling their first image (see Figure A.8). The
training interface includes the master training window where workers can create
and delete points and scroll across the entire image. To the left, there is a small
image displaying example tumor cells. Above the master window, they have
zoom in / out buttons. And on the top right there is a thumbnail view of the
overall image.
(a) Meaningful treatment (b) Zero-context / Shredded treatments
Figure A.8: The training interface as seen by workers. The meaningful interface reminds the
subjects in 8 places that they are identifying tumor cells. The zero-context interface only says
“objects of interest” and the shredded condition in addition has a message in red indicating
that their points will not be saved (unshown). The circles around each point were not visible
to participants. We display them to illustrate the size of a 10-pixel radius.
Participants were given 15 minutes to mark an image. Above the training
window, we displayed a countdown timer that indicated the amount of time
left. The participant’s total earnings was also prominently displayed atop. On
the very top, we provided a submit button that allowed the worker to submit
results at any time.
Each image had the same 90 cells from various-sized clusters. The cell clus-
ters were selected for their unambiguous examples of cells, thereby eliminating
the difficulty of training the difficult-to-identify tumor cells. In each image, the
same clusters were arranged and rotated haphazardly, then pasted on one of
five different believable backgrounds using Adobe Photoshop. Those clusters
were then further rotated to create a set of ten images. This setup guarantees
that the difficulty was relatively the same image-image. Images were displayed
in random order for each worker, repeating after each set of ten (repetition was
not an issue since it was rare for a participant to label more than ten).
After the worker is finished labeling, the worker presses submit and they are
led to an intermediate page which asks if they would like to label another image
and the new wage is prominently displayed (see Figure A.9). In the meaningful
treatment, we add one last cue of meaning — a stock photo of a researcher to
emphasize the purpose of the task. In the shredded treatment, we append the
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text “NONE of your points will be saved because we are testing our system,
but you will still be paid.” If the worker wishes to continue, they are led to
another labeling task; otherwise, they are directed to the post manipulation
check survey shown in figure A.10.
The program ensures that the worker is being honest. We require them to
find more than 20% of the cells (the workers were unaware that we were able
to monitor their accuracy). If they are found cheating on three images, they
are deemed fraudulent and not allowed to train more images. Since payment is
automatic, this is to protect us from a worker depleting our research account.
In practice, this happened rarely and was not correlated with treatment.
(a) Zero-context / Shredded treatments (b) Meaningful treatment
Figure A.9: The landing page after a labeling task is completed. At this point, workers are
asked if they’d like to label another image or quit and be paid what they’ve earned so far.
Appendix B. A Technical Guide to Running Field Experiments on
Mechanical Turk
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Requirements
This study requires the use of deception in order to observe social preferences
in a natural environment and thus is not exempted under category 2’s survey
procedures. The issue is you cannot give the subjects an initial consent form
indicating that they are part of an experiment.
Upon waiving the requirement of consent, the IRB will most likely require
you to issue a debrief statement to your subjects stating that they were part of
an experiment, a blurb about the purpose of the experiment, and contact infor-
mation to your institution’s IRB. In order for the experiment to work properly,
you can only issue the debriefing after data collection is completed. Otherwise,
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Figure A.10: The survey a subject fills out upon completion of the task.
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MTurk subjects can communicate to each other that this is a study and this
may be a problem for internal validity.
Engineering Required
The implementation of an experiment of similar scale to the one we de-
scribe in the paper requires no more than two weeks of full-time work for an
experienced software engineer.
It is critical that the engineer be fluent in “front-end” design. The front-
end is what your subjects will use throughout the experiment and it can be
highly dynamic, responding to the individual participant’s actions. MTurk tasks
are rendered in HTML and CSS. Javascript controls the dynamism and AJAX
provides smooth client-server communication. Although not used in this study,
the front-end can become even more fancy by implementing Adobe Flash or
Microsoft Silverlight applets.
An MTurk experiment also requires a back-end web stack consisting of an
http server, a database, and a server-side platform. The back-end’s function
is to render webpages and store the experiment’s data. We recommend Ruby
on Rails 3.1 because of its rapid development speed, inexpensive and instant
deployment to rented space in “the Cloud,” and because it is free and open-
source.
Since the server must communicate with MTurk, it is convenient for the
engineer to also have experience using the Amazon web services application
programming interface (MTurk’s API) as well as CRON jobs on Linux.
We recommend setting up two cron jobs for effective experimentation:
1. A CRON that creates HITs every 15 minutes. In order for subjects to see
your task, it must remain fresh on Amazon’s main page. Creating tasks
every 15 min with short expiration times (an hour or so) will allow for
maximum throughput.
2. Another CRON that automatically pays workers. We recommend doing
this every hour or so. It’s important that this be done automatically
including the bonuses and rejections otherwise it will be cumbersome for
the experimenter to check through each and every assignment.
Apart from technical skills, the engineer should also have knowledge of the
principles of experimental design.
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